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QUESTIONING THE RELEVANCE OF 
MIRANDA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Richard A. Leo* 
lNTRODUCTION1 
Miranda v. Arizona2 is the most well-known criminal j ustice deci­
sion - arguably the most well-known legal decision - in American 
history. Since it was decided in 1966, the Miranda decision has 
spawned voluminous newspaper coverage, political and legal debate, 
and academic commentary. The Miranda warnings themselves have 
become so well-known through the media of television that most peo­
ple recognize them immediately.3 As Patrick Malone has pointed out, 
the Miranda decision has added its own lexicon of words and phrases 
to the American language.4 Perhaps with this understanding in mind, 
George Thomas recently suggested that the Miranda warnings are 
more well-known to school children than the Gettysburg address,5 
foreshadowing the Supreme Court's statement in Dickerson v. United 
States that "Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice 
to the point where the warnings have become part of our national cul­
ture. "6 But even this may be an understatement: beyond the borders of 
the United States, the Miranda warnings may be more well known 
than virtually any other feature of the American criminal justice sys­
tem. 
* Assistant Professor of Criminology, Law & Society and Assistant Professor of 
Psychology and Social Behavior, University of California, Irvine. J.D. 1994, Boalt Hall 
School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; Ph.D. 1994, University of California, 
Berkeley. 
1. I thank George Thomas, Charles Weisselberg, and Welsh White for their helpful 
comments. 
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3. SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN 
CRIMINALJUSTICE, 1950-1990, at 51-52 (1993). 
4. Patrick Malone, You Have the Right to Remain Silent: Miranda After Twenty Years, 
55 AM . SCHOLAR 367 (1986). 
5. THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE AND POLICING xv (Richard A. Leo & 
George C. Thomas III, eds., 1998). As George Thomas points out elsewhere, "the typical TV 
viewer has heard Miranda warnings given hundreds of times, with no discernible effect on 
the 'good guys' getting the confession from the guilty suspects." George Thomas, The End of 
the Road for Miranda v. Arizona, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 12 (2000). 
6. 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000). 
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From all this attention, one might reasonably infer that the impact 
of the Miranda decision - on police, on criminal suspects, on confes­
sion and conviction rates, on the American public - continues to be 
enormous. The purpose of this Essay is to question assumptions about 
the effects of Miranda and to suggest that legal scholars devote more 
energy to the empirical study of other, more significant, aspects of po­
lice interrogation and confessions. While it may have initially exerted 
a substantial impact on police interrogation practices and the criminal 
justice system, Miranda may no longer be as relevant as it once was to 
understanding how police interrogate, why suspects do or do not con­
fess, and which legal reforms best serve the imperatives of crime con­
trol, due process and justice. In Part I, I review two generations of 
studies assessing Miranda's impact to set forth what we know and do 
not know about the ongoing macro-level impact of Miranda. In Part 
II, I take a more micro-level view to analyze the probable impact of 
Miranda on the central actors in the criminal justice system in the 
twenty-first century. Both Parts I and II conclude that Miranda has 
had a very limited impact (positive or negative) on the criminal justice 
system in the last two decades. Finally, in Part III, I conclude with 
some observations about the importance of mandatory video-taping of 
police interrogations and the future of legal scholarship on police in­
terrogation practices and confession law. It is not the purpose of this 
Essay to provide any hard and fast answers to enduring and difficult 
questions, but rather to question our assumptions about Miranda's 
real world relevance in the twenty-first century and to suggest less 
popular, but arguably far more important, directions for policy innova­
tion and future scholarship in this area. 
I .  THE MIRANDA IMPACT STUDIES 
A. First Generation Studies (1966-1973) 
In the three decades prior to Miranda, there had been relatively lit­
tle field research on police interrogation practices in America.7 It was 
thus hardly surprising that the Warren Court in 1966 relied on police 
training manuals - rather than empirical studies - to describe the 
techniques and methods of police interrogation in America. Empha­
sizing the absence of first-hand knowledge of actual police interroga­
tion practices at the time, the Warren Court in Miranda noted that: 
"Interrogation still takes place in privacy. Privacy results in secrecy 
7. For some pre-Miranda studies that included an analysis or discussion of observations 
of actual interrogations, see WILLIAM A. WESTLEY, VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE: A 
SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF LAW, CUSTOM, AND MORALITY (1970); AMERICAN BAR 
FOUNDATION, THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: 
PILOT PROJECT REPORT (1957); Edward Barrett, Jr., Police Practices and the Law - from 
Arrest to Release or Charge, 50 CAL. L. REV. 1 1  (1962). 
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and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact 
goes on in the interrogation room."8 
In the years immediately following the Miranda decision, scholars 
published approximately a dozen empirical studies that sought to fill 
in this gap.9 These studies relied on a variety of methodologies (e.g., 
participant observation, survey research, interviews, analysis of case 
files) and were undertaken in a variety of locations (e.g., Pittsburgh, 
New Haven, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, Denver, Madison, and 
elsewhere). In the main, these studies sought to identify and analyze 
police implementation of, and compliance with, the new Miranda re­
quirements; police attitudes toward Miranda; the effect of the Miranda 
warning and waiver regime on police and suspect behavior during in­
terrogation; and the impact of Miranda on confession, clearance, and 
conviction rates. 
Several scholars have catalogued and analyzed the findings of the 
first generation Miranda studies.10 Although an in-depth discussion of 
these studies is beyond the scope of this Essay, several general pat­
terns are worth briefly noting. First, in the initial aftermath of 
Miranda, some police began immediately complying with Miranda,11 
8. 384 U.S. 436, 448, 466 (1965). 
9. See NEIL A. MILNER, THE COURT AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT: THE IMPACT 
OF MIRANDA (1971); John Griffiths & Richard Ayres, Faculty Note, A Postscript to the 
Miranda Project, Interrogation of Draft Protesters, 77 YALE L. J. 300 (1967); Lawrence S. 
Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47 DENY. L.J. 1 
(1970); Richard J. Medalie et al., Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The 
Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347 (1968); David W. Neubauer, 
Confessions in Prairie City: Some Causes and Effects, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 103 
(1974); Cyril D. Robinson, Police and Prosecutor Practices and Attitudes Relating to Interro­
gation as Revealed by Pre- and Post-Miranda Questionnaires: A Construct of Police Capacity 
to Comply, 3 DUKE L. J. 425 (1968); Roger C. Schaefer, Patrolman Perspectives on Miranda, 
1971 LAW & THE Soc. ORD. 81 (1971); Richard Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Jr., 
Miranda in Pittsburgh - A Statistical Study, 29 PITT. L. REV. 1 (1967); Otis Stephens et al., 
Law Enforcement and the Supreme Court: Police Perceptions of the Miranda Requirements, 
39 TENN. L. REV. 407 (1972); Michael Wald et al., Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact 
of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967); James W. Witt, Non-Coercive Interrogation and the 
Administration of Criminal Justice: The Impact of Miranda on Police Effectuality, 64 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 320 (1973); Evelle J. Younger, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants­
Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 255 (1966) [hereinafter Younger, 
Interrogation]; Evelle J. Younger, Results of a Survey Conducted in the District Attorney's 
Office of Los Angeles County Regarding the Effect of the Miranda Decision Upon the Prose­
cution of Felony Cases, 5 AM. CRIM. L. Q. 32 (1966) [hereinafter Younger, Results]. In addi­
tion to these published studies, prosecutors' offices in several other cities conducted surveys 
and ventured speculations of the confession rates in the period immediately prior and subse­
quent to the Miranda decision. For a catalogue of these unpublished speculations, see Paul 
Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV., 387, 397-418 
(1996). 
10. Younger, Interrogation, supra note 9 at 33. See Richard A. Leo, The Impact of 
Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 632-645 (1996); Cassell, supra note 
9, at 394-433; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and 
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 516-538 (1996). 
11. Younger, Interrogation, supra note 9, at 32. 
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while others ignored the decision or failed to recite part or all of the 
required warnings to suspects in custody.12 After a brief adjustment 
period, however, virtually all police began to regularly comply with 
the letter, though not always the spirit, of the fourfold warning and 
waiver requirements.U Despite their compliance, however, many de­
tectives resented the new Miranda requirements.14 
Second, despite the fourfold warnings, suspects frequently waived 
their Miranda rights and chose, instead, to speak to their interrogators. 
Some researchers attributed this largely unexpected finding to the 
manner in which detectives delivered the Miranda warnings,15 while 
others attributed it to the failure of suspects to understand the mean­
ing or significance of their Miranda rights.16 
Third, once a waiver of rights had been obtained, the tactics and 
techniques of police interrogation did not appear to change as a result 
of Miranda. For example, Wald et al. observed in New Haven that 
Miranda appeared to have little impact on police behavior during in­
terrogation, since detectives continued to employ many of the psy­
chological tactics of persuasion and manipulation that the Warren 
Court had deplored in Miranda.17 Stephens reported that while most 
detectives in Knoxville, Tennessee, and Macon, Georgia, issued for­
malized warnings, Miranda did not change the nature and role of the 
interrogation process.18 
12. Wald et al., supra note 9, at 1550. 
13. Id. at 1550-51; Leiken, supra note 9, at 9-10, 14, 47 (finding "strict compliance with 
[Miranda's] formal requirements."). Leiken's study also suggested that police sometimes 
ignored suspects' refusals to waive rights. Id. at 30. 
14. For example, police interrogators in New Haven viewed the requirements as artifi­
cial, unnecessary and generally impugning of police integrity, while police detectives in 
Macon, Georgia, and Knoxville, Tennessee, almost uniformly felt that Miranda had ham­
pered their ability to investigate and solve crime effectively by undermining the authorita­
tiveness of their relations with criminal suspects. Wald et al., supra note 9, at 1610-1 1;  
Stephens et al., supra note 9, at 423. Wisconsin police also viewed Miranda as harmful and 
drastic. MILNER, supra note 9, at 219. 
15. For example, Wald et al. believed that New Haven detectives often intoned the 
warnings in a mechanical, bureaucratic manner so as to trivialize their potential significance 
and minimize their effectiveness, sometimes coaxing ambivalent suspects into waiving their 
rights. Wald et al., supra note 9, at 1552. Leiken argued that police used the very psychologi­
cal pressures deplored by the Miranda court, including promises and threats to induce sus­
pects to sign waiver forms and subsequently to elicit statements and confessions. Leiken, su­
pra note 9, at 37-41. 
16. For example, Medalie argued that a significant number of suspects in the District of 
Columbia did not understand the right to silence or the right to appointed counsel. Medalie, 
supra note 9, at 1374-75. Wald et al. and Leiken argued that many suspects in New Haven 
and Denver, respectively, were unable to grasp the meaning of their Miranda rights. Wald et 
al., supra note 9, at 1554-55, 1614; Leiken, supra note 9, at 14-15. 
17. Wald et al., supra note 9, at 1542-43. 
18. Stephens et al., supra note 9, at 430. 
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Fourth, suspects· continued to provide detectives with confessions 
and incriminating statements. In some studies, however, researchers 
reported· a lower rate of confession following the Miranda decision 
than prior to Miranda. For example, Seeburger and Wettick reported 
that in Pittsburgh, the confession rate dropped from 54.4 % prior to 
Miranda to 37.5% after Miranda, though the specific amount varied 
by the type of crime reported.19 Yet other researchers reported only a 
marginal decrease in the confession rate. For example, Witt reported 
that in "Seaside City" (a pseudonym for a beach city in Los Angeles) 
the confession rate dropped only two percent (from 69% before the 
Miranda decision to 67% after the Miranda decision).20 And one re­
searcher even reported an increase in the confession rate of approxi­
mately 10% after Miranda.21 
Fifth, researchers reported that clearance and conviction rates had 
not been adversely affected by the new Miranda requirements. For 
example, even though Seeburger and Wettick found a 17% decline in 
the confession rate of suspects in Pittsburgh, they -did not find a corre­
sponding decline in the conviction rate.22 Other researchers reported 
significant, if temporary, declines in clearance rates, but also noted 
that conviction rates remained relatively constant.23 Moreover, even 
where conviction rates dropped along with clearance rates, the drop 
was not significant. For example, in his study of "Seaside City," Witt 
reported a 3% decline in the clearance rate and a 9% decline in the 
conviction rate (from 92% to 84%) after Miranda became law.24 If 
there was a significant cost to Miranda according to first generation 
impact researchers, it appeared to be that Miranda may have caused 
the interrogation rate to drop and may also have been responsible for 
lessening the effectiveness of the collateral functions of interrogation 
such as identifying accomplices, clearing crimes and recovering stolen 
property.25 
Regardless, the consensus that emerged from the first generation 
of Miranda impact studies was that the Miranda rules have had only a 
marginal effect on the ability of the police to successfully elicit confes-
19. Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 9, at 1 1 .  
20. Witt, supra note 9 ,  a t  325. 
21 .  Younger, Interrogation, supra note 9, at 260. 
22. Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 9, at 20. A confession is not always necessary for 
conviction, and thus a decline in the confession rate will not inevitably produce a decline in 
the conviction rate. 
23. For example, Milner notes in his study of four Wisconsin police departments that, in 
the year following Miranda, the clearance rate went down significantly (13-51 %), but that 
the conviction rate remained relatively constant for the two departments that provided 
Milner with statistics. MILNER, supra note 9, at 218-19. 
24. Witt, supra note 9, at 328-29. 
25. Id. at 332. 
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sions and on the ability of prosecutors to win convictions, despite the 
fact that some detectives continued to perceive that Miranda's impact 
was substantial.26 The general view of these studies is not merely that 
Miranda has failed to adversely affect the ability of police to control 
crime, but also that, in practice, the requirement of standard Miranda 
warnings failed to achieve the goal or impact originally envisioned by 
the Warren Court. 
The first-generation Miranda impact researchers are to be com­
mended for the efforts they expended in gathering data on Miranda's 
real world impact in the immediate years after the case was decided. 
However, as I have argued elsewhere, the generalizability and con­
temporary relevance of these findings are undermined by two key fac­
tors. First, these studies are largely outdated. The data in each of the 
first-generation Miranda impact studies was gathered during the first 
three years following the Miranda decision in the mid-to-late 1960s. 
Therefore, these studies arguably captured only the initial effects of 
Miranda before police officers and detectives had fully adjusted to the 
new procedures.27 Second, many of these studies are methodologically 
weak, perhaps because they were virtually all conducted by lawyers or 
law professors without any training in the research methods of social 
science.28 
B. Second Generation Studies (1996-Present) 
The first generation of Miranda impact studies had run their 
course by 1973. For the next two decades, the social science and legal 
community, with few exceptions,29 appeared to lose interest in the em­
pirical study of Miranda's impact on criminal justice processes and 
outcomes. Since the mid-1990s, however, there has been a second 
flurry or generation of empirical Miranda impact studies. These stud-
26. Id. at 322-25. 
27. Schulhofer, supra note 10, at 506 ("(E]ven if we can assume that the studies give a 
reliable picture of Miranda's costs thirty years ago, there is strong reason to believe that such 
costs were transitory and that confession rates have since rebounded from any temporary 
decline."). 
28. As I have pointed out elsewhere: 
[S]ome of the studies did not disaggregate the data they collected and thus lack any system­
atic analysis between independent and dependent variables in their sample. Three of the 
studies that did disaggregate their quantitative data failed to employ even the most elemen­
tary statistical techniques to evaluate whether any of the pre-Miranda and post-Miranda dif­
ferences observed were statistically significant. More fundamentally, several of the studies 
suffer from selection and respondent biases that undermine the validity and generalizability 
of their findings. 
Leo, supra note 10, at 647 (citations omitted). 
29. John Gruhl & Cassia Spohn, The Supreme Court's Post-Miranda Rulings: Impact on 
Local Prosecutors, 3 LAW & POL'Y Q. 29 (1981); Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to 
Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134 (1980). 
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ies might loosely be divided into two types: those that seek to assess 
the quantitative impact of Miranda on confession, clearance, and con­
viction rates; and those that qualitatively seek to assess Miranda's real 
world impact on how police issue warnings and elicit waivers, whether 
and how they comply with or circumvent Miranda's requirements, and 
Miranda's effects on police interrogation methods and confessions. 
Unlike their first generation counterparts , however, the second gen­
eration impact studies have generated considerable interpretive dis­
agreement, debate, and commentary. 
The most well-known "debate" in the second-generation studies 
has been between Paul Cassell and Stephen Schulhofer. Selectively re­
analyzing the first generation impact studies, as well as several unpub­
lished surveys conducted by prosecutors' offices in several cities im­
mediately prior to and after Miranda, Cassell speculated in 1996 both 
that Miranda has caused a 16% reduction in the confession rate and 
that it is responsible for lost convictions in 3.8% of all serious criminal 
cases.30 Utilizing such figures, Cassell concluded that, as a result of 
Miranda, the government fails to obtain convictions in approximately 
28,000 violent crime and 79,000 property crime cases each year and is 
forced to settle for plea bargains on terms more favorable to criminal 
defendants in a similar number of cases.31 Shortly after publishing 
these figures, Cassell substantially revised them and argued that each 
year 100,000 violent criminals (who would otherwise be convicted and 
incarcerated) go free as a direct result of the Miranda requirements.32 
Re-analyzing the same data,33 Stephen Schulhofer has speculated that 
Miranda may have initially caused a 4.1 % drop in the confession rate 
in the immediate post-Miranda period and a 0.78% drop in the convic­
tion rate.34 Based on his analysis, Schulhofer has argued that "for all 
practical purposes, Miranda's empirically detectable net damage to 
law enforcement is zero."35 
In a number of subsequent law review and newspaper articles, 
Cassell has continued to argue that Miranda has substantially de­
pressed the confession rate and imposed significant costs on society by 
allowing tens of thousands of guilty suspects to escape conviction. In a 
study of prosecutorial screening sessions involving a sample of 219 
suspects, Cassell found that 42.2% of the suspects who were ques-
30. Cassell, supra note 9, at 437-438. 
31. Id. at 440. 
32. Paul Cassell, True Confessions About Miranda Legacy, LEGAL TIMES, July 22, 1996, 
at 22. 
33. Schulhofer properly excludes the unpublished studies that Cassell had included in 
his analysis of Miranda's quantitative effect. Schulhofer, supra note 10, at 516-38. 
34. Id. at 541-42. 
35. Id. at 547. 
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tioned gave incriminating statements, a confession rate that he argued 
is far lower than pre-Miranda confession rates.36 Analyzing national 
aggregate clearance data, Cassell has asserted that about one out of 
every four violent crimes that was "cleared" before Miranda was not 
cleared "after" Miranda, and has attributed the decline in clearance 
rates to the Miranda decision.37 In a subsequent law review article 
based on a multiple regression analysis of the time series of Federal 
Bureau of Investigation reported national clearance rates,38 Cassell 
and his co-author Richard Fowles claimed that Miranda caused clear­
ance rates to drop sharply for certain crimes during the years 1966-
1968, and argued that "[a]s many as 36,000 robberies, 82,000 burgla­
ries, 163,000 larcenies, and 78,000 vehicle thefts remain uncleared each 
year as a result of Miranda."39 Based on all of these studies, Cassell ar­
gues not only that "Miranda has seriously harmed society by hamper­
ing the ability of the police [to elicit the confessions necessary] to solve 
crimes," but also that "Miranda may be the single most damaging 
blow inflicted on the nation's ability to fight crime in the last half cen­
tury."40 
Though he has garnered considerable attention from some of the 
nation's top law reviews, as well as the media, Cassell's quantitative 
claims have not been generally accepted in either the legal or social 
science community. Instead, numerous scholars,  including myself, 
have disputed Cassell's findings and/or inferences and have criticized 
his objectivity,41 methodology,42 and conclusions.43 For example, 
36. Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical 
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV . 839, 869 (1996). 
37. Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda's Defenders, 
90 Nw. L. REV . 1084, 1090 (1996). 
38. Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective 
on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998). 
39. Id. at 1126. 
40. Id. at 1132. In an interview with 60 Minutes, Cassell was less ambiguous, asserting 
unequivocally that Miranda is "the most damaging blow inflicted on law enforcement in the 
last half-century." 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 5, 1999). Elsewhere, Cassell 
has stated that "there are literally hundreds of thousands of criminal cases that have not 
been solved because of Miranda." Roger Parloff, Miranda on the Hot Seat, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 26, 1999, at 84-86. 
41. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat 
Miranda: Another Reply to Paul Cassell, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557, 557 ("Paul 
Cassell advances several logically flawed and empirically erroneous propositions. These 
propositions appear to stem from Cassell's ideological commitments."); Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Miranda and Clearance Rates, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 278, 278 (1996) ("Yet once 
again, [Cassell's) arguments rest on selective descriptions of the data and - I am sorry to say 
- indefensibly partisan characterizations of the underlying material."); George C. Thomas 
III ,  Telling Half-Truths, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 12, 1996, at 20 ("While Miranda is not immune 
from questioning, advocacy cannot replace careful scholarship."); id. at 24 ("[S)cholars have 
a duty to describe all the evidence and to acknowledge contrary interpretations if they are 
widely held. Professor Cassell draws a one-sided picture of the evidence against Miranda."); 
Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 176 & n.332 (1998) 
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Schulhofer has repeatedly criticized Cassell for selectively citing data, 
presenting sources and quotes out of context, and advancing indefen­
sibly partisan analyses.44 Schulhofer has also disputed some of 
Cassell's factual assertions,45 provided alternative explanations for pat­
terns in Cassell's data,46 and continued to argue that there is no em­
pirical support for Cassell's claim that Miranda has measurably re­
duced confession rates.47 Other scholars have criticized Cassell for 
oversimplifying complicated issues,48 presenting speculation as fact,49 
(suggesting that "one may question Cassell's motives" and pointing out that "Cassell has 
presented his views as an advocate in litigation" and does not acknowledge "critiques of his 
work or otherwise acknowledge that his empirical analyses are much disputed"). 
42. See, e.g., Weisselberg, supra note 41, at 176 (noting Cassell's "flawed methodolo­
gies"); id. at 177 ("Cassell's work, with its dubious methods, sets a poor benchmark from 
which to base a revision of Miranda's settled rules."); Thomas, supra note 41, at 21 ("Cassell 
relies on flawed studies, while rejecting other studies that show little or no effect from 
Miranda. His empirical theories and underlying methodologies have been strongly criti­
cized."); Schulhofer, supra note 10, at 502 ("(A)t critical points in (Cassell's) analysis, data 
are cited selectively, sources are quoted out of context, weak studies showing negative im­
pacts are uncritically accepted, and small methodological problems are invoked to discredit a 
no-harm conclusion when the same difficulties are present - to an even greater extent - in 
the negative-impact studies that Cassell chooses to feature."). 
43. Schulhofer, supra note 41, at 280 ("Like the statistics and quotations Cassell fea­
tured in his original article, his national clearance-rate data have been isolated from their 
context in order to support a dramatic but misleading claim."); Welsh S. White, What Is An 
Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001, 2031 n.189 (1998) (stating that 
"even if Cassell's calculations deserved to be taken seriously, his conclusions would be sub­
ject to the criticism: garbage in, garbage out"); Peter Arenella, Miranda Stories, 20 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 375, 380 (1997) ("Cassell has clearly exaggerated the extent to which the 
Miranda regime has hampered law enforcement."). 
44. Schulhofer, supra note 10, at 502 ("[A)t critical points in [Cassell's) analysis, data are 
cited selectively, sources are quoted out of context, weak studies showing negative impacts 
are uncritically accepted, and small methodological problems are invoked to discredit a no­
harm conclusion when the same difficulties are present - to an even greater extent - in the 
negative-impact studies that Cassell chooses to feature."); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Pointing in 
the Wrong Direction, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 12, 1996, at 21 ("Readers should understand that 
these are simply advocacy numbers, derived from indefensibly selective accounts of the 
available data."); Schulhofer, supra note 41, at 280 ("Like the statistics and quotations Cas­
sell featured in his original article, his national clearance-rate data have been isolated from 
their context in order to support a dramatic but misleading claim."). Elsewhere, Schulhofer 
has described some of Cassell's empirical assertions about Miranda as "junk science of the 
silliest sort." Alexander Nguyen, The Assault on Miranda, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 27-Apr. 10, 
2000, at 59. 
· 
45. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Bashing Miranda is Unjustified - And Harmful, 20 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 347, 358 (1997) (arguing that, while Professor Cassell claimed that clear­
ance rates fell dramatically following Miranda, in fact, the number of violent crimes cleared 
after Miranda did not decline at all). 
46. For example, Schulhofer has argued that the cause of the declining clearance rate 
was a decline in police resources relative to an increase in crime, not Miranda. Schulhofer, 
supra note 41, at 281-85; Schulhofer, supra note 45, at 358-60. 
47. Schulhofer, supra note 10, at 505-06; Schulhofer, supra note 45, at 353-55. 
48. Leo & Ofshe, supra note 41, at 563 ("The problem with Cassell's impulse to quanti­
fication . . .  is that it oversimplifies complicated issues and inevitably presents speculation as 
fact."). 
March 2001] Miranda in the Twenty-First Century 1009 
failing to address contrary evidence and widely held interpretations,50 
and ultimately, for failing to demonstrate that Miranda has caused a 
decline in confession, clearance or conviction rates.51 
Despite the disagreements between Cassell and his many critics, 
there appears to be relatively little dispute among second generation 
researchers on several aspects of Miranda's real world effects. First, 
police appear to issue and document Miranda warnings in virtually all 
cases.52 Second, police appear to have successfully "adapted" to the 
Miranda requirements. Thus, in practice, police have developed 
strategies that are intended to induce Miranda waivers.53 Third, police 
appear to elicit waivers from suspects in roughly 80% of their interro­
gations,54 though suspects with criminal records appear disproportion-
49. Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators' 
Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 404 n.30 
(1999) ("Cassell's attempt at informed quantification amounts to no more than elaborate 
speculation . . . .  "). 
50. Weisselberg, supra note 41 , at 176 n.332 ("Cassell does not cite to Schulhofer's or 
Donohue's critiques of his work or otherwise acknowledge that his empirical analyses are 
much disputed."). 
51. E.g., George C. Thomas III, Plain Talk About the Miranda Empirical Debate: A 
"Steady-State" Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REV. 933, 957 (1996) ("[N]othing in the 
old studies or the new ones provides sufficient evidence to accept the hypothesis that 
Miranda has depressed the rate of confessions."); Arenella, supra note 43, at 380 ("Cassell 
has clearly exaggerated the extent to which the Miranda regime has hampered law enforce­
ment."); John J. Donohue III, Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1 147 (1998) (questioning Cassell's assertion that Miranda caused a statistically signifi­
cance drop in actual clearance rates). Weisselberg summarizes the heart of this critique: 
John Donohue has analyzed the Cassell and Fowles study closely. As an initial matter, 
Donohue notes that FBI clearance data have proven unreliable because, in addition to the 
manipulation of clearance rates by local authorities, a perceived decline in clearance rates 
may reflect nothing more than the improved reporting of crime . . . .  Donohue also doubts 
Cassell's and Fowles's conclusion that Miranda alone lies at the root of any perceived drop 
in clearance rates in the late 1960s . . . .  [Donohue concludes that Miranda] should not have a 
substantial impact upon clearance rates because solving a crime clears it whether or not an 
arrest or prosecution occurs, and Miranda only operates after a suspect is in custody . . . .  In 
the end, however, Cassell provides the wrong answers to the wrong questions. 
Weisselberg, supra note 41, at 175-76. 
52. Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 
276 (1996). 
53. As Welsh White and I have written elsewhere: 
Empirical data indicates that the police deliver the Miranda warnings in at least three ways. 
First, the police may deliver the warnings in a neutral manner; second, they may de­
emphasize the warnings' significance by delivering them in a manner that is designed to ob­
scure the adversarial relationship between the interrogator and the suspect; and, third, they 
may deliver the warnings in a way that communicates to the suspect that waiving his rights 
will result in some immediate or future benefit for him. 
Leo & White, supra note 49, at 432. See also Leo, supra note 10, at 658-65; DAVID SIMON, 
HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 204-20 (1991) (describing an interrogation 
of a suspect after he waived his Miranda rights). 
54. Leo, supra note 52, at 276; Cassell & Hayman, supra note 36, at 860. 
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ately likely to invoke their rights and terminate interrogation.ss 
Fourth, in some jurisdictions police are systematically trained to vio­
late Miranda by questioning "outside Miranda" (i.e., by continuing to 
question suspects who have invoked the right to counsel or the right to 
remain silent).s6 Finally, some researchers have argued that Miranda 
eradicated the last vestiges of third degree interrogation present in the 
mid-1960s, increased the level of professionalism among interrogators, 
and raised public awareness of constitutional rights.s7 
The second generation of Miranda impact research has been far 
more spirited and engaging than the first round of studies. Yet despite 
the new energy that empirically-oriented scholars have breathed into 
the Miranda debate and despite the renewed calls for more empirical 
research on Miranda's real world effects,ss the second generation of 
Miranda impact scholarship may be at a close. Now that the Supreme 
Court has resolved any questions about Miranda's constitutional un­
derpinnings, it is highly unlikely that the Court will reconsider any 
constitutional challenges to Miranda for many years, if not decades, to 
come. As a result, there may be little incentive for either Miranda's 
supporters or Miranda's critics to continue the difficult task of gath­
ering and interpreting data on Miranda's measurable effects. The 
Supreme Court in Dickerson made its own empirical assessments of 
Miranda's impact when it stated that, "Miranda has become embed­
ded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have 
become part of our national culture,"s9 yet it did so without consider­
ing any of the first or second generation research of Miranda's real 
55. Leo, supra note 10, at 654-55; SIMON, supra note 53, at 210-11; see also Cassell & 
Hayman, supra note 36, at 895-96. British research also demonstrates that suspects with prior 
records are significantly more likely to remain silent or seek counsel. E.g., PAULA SOFrLEY, 
HOME OFFICE RESEARCH UNIT, ROY AL COMM'N ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RESEARCH 
STUDY NO. 4 POLICE INTERROGATION: AN OBSERVATIONAL STUDY IN FOUR STATIONS 
(1980). 
56. The interrogator's objective is to convince the suspect that he can talk to the inter­
rogator without any fear that his words will be used against him. To achieve this goal, the 
interrogator either may tell the suspect explicitly that nothing he says can be used against 
him, implicitly communicate the same message through statements to the effect that the sus­
pect's answers will be off the record, or tell the suspect that his statement will be used only 
to help the interrogator understand what happened. The purpose of questioning outside 
Miranda is to obtain a confession that may be used to impeach a suspect should he take the 
stand at trial and may also be used to discover non-testimonial evidence against the suspect, 
which also can be used at trial. Weisselberg, supra note 41 , at 189-92; Leo & White, supra 
note 49, at 447-50; Charles Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. 
REV. 1121 (2001). 
57. Leo, supra note 10, at 668-74; SIMON, supra note 53, at 211.  
58. E.g., George C. Thomas III, Is Miranda A Real World Failure? A Plea for More (and 
Better) Empirical Evidence, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821 (1996); Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. 
Harcourt, Foreword, Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitlltional 
Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733 (2000). 
59. 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000). 
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world effects. This result is particularly surprising in light of the fact 
that Paul Cassell litigated the challenge to Miranda before the 
Supreme Court in Dickerson. That the Court ignored even the 
Miranda impact research of one of the primary litigants might, under­
standably, dissuade advocates on both sides of the Miranda debate 
from pursuing another round of empirical research on Miranda's real 
world effects on the interrogation process, public attitudes, or confes­
sion and conviction rates. After all, for the foreseeable future, 
Miranda is here to stay. 
II. MIRANDA'S IMPACT ON INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS 
A. Introduction 
The purpose of the preceding section was to describe the main 
findings from two generations of Miranda impact studies in the last 
thirty-five years. The purpose of this section is to qualitatively evalu­
ate Miranda's seeming real world effects on the various actors, agen­
cies, and institutions that comprise the criminal justice system. A nar­
row focus on Miranda's quantitative impact on such macro-level 
statistics as confession, clearance, and conviction rates may cause us to 
lose sight of the more mundane impact of Miranda on everyday crimi­
nal j ustice actors and processes.60 Unlike most Miranda impact studies, 
this Essay seeks to break down Miranda's impact (or lack of impact) 
on sub-parts of the criminal justice system in order to arrive at a better 
understanding of Miranda's impact (or lack of impact) on the whole. 
I argue that an examination of Miranda's effect on various institu­
tional actors supports the conclusion that Miranda's impact may be 
relatively inconsequential in practice and may have been overstated in 
much second-generation scholarship. However, I do not profess to 
provide hard and fast answers in this short Essay. I therefore offer this 
argument more as a critique and a hypothesis than as a firm assertion. 
For despite two dozen or so original studies on various aspects of 
Miranda's impact in thirty-five years, in many ways we still lack fun­
damentally good data in this area.61 Nevertheless, what the first gen­
eration researchers suggested of their era may be true of ours: that 
Miranda's impact in practice is negligible. While Miranda may have 
initially exerted a substantial effect on police practices and public atti-
60. Miranda's statistical impact on conviction rates in a sample of cases could be studied 
using multiple regression analysis (to hold constant confounding variables) and statistical 
significance (to infer likely causation). See Leo, supra note 10, at 676 & n.244. The impact of 
Miranda on the "lost" confession rate is, however, unknowable since it presumes a counter­
factual world which does not exist and therefore cannot be measured. See Thomas, supra 
note 58, at 825-26, 834-37; Weisselberg, supra note 41, at 173-75; Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda 
Dead, Was it Overruled, or is it Irrelevant?, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 461 (1998). 
61 . Cassell & Hayman, supra note 36, at 840 ("Even the most informed observers can 
offer little beyond speculation on these fundamental subjects."). 
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tudes, this impact may have diminished as the criminal justice system 
adjusted to its dictates, and Miranda became normalized among the 
police, prosecutors, and the public. If I am right, this phenomenon 
may explain both why police and prosecutors, for the most part, no 
longer complain about Miranda, as well as why Miranda is perceived 
by many as no longer imposing serious costs on the criminal justice 
system. My intent here is not to defend Miranda (or, for that matter, 
to attack it), but, rather, simply to question what Miranda really deliv­
ers in practice. I will suggest not only that Miranda's costs may be 
negligible, but that its practical benefits may also be negligible. It may 
be time, as Alfredo Garcia has suggested, to reconsider whether 
Miranda is even relevant to the type of criminal justice system we wish 
to have. 
B. Suspects 
As many writers have pointed out, the daily stream of detective 
shows seems to have educated everyone (in America and abroad) 
about the fact and content of the Miranda warning and waiver re­
quirements. There has been a widespread diffusion of the Miranda lit­
any in American culture not only through television programs, but 
also through movies, detective fiction, and the popular press. It is 
therefore unlikely that many criminal suspects today hear the Miranda 
rights for the first time prior to police questioning; in fact, suspects are 
likely to have heard Miranda so many times on television that the 
Miranda warnings may have a familiar, numbing ring. A national poll 
in 1984 revealed that 93% of those surveyed knew they had a right to 
an attorney if arrested,62 and a national poll in 1991 revealed that 80% 
knew they had a right to remain silent if arrested.63 With the infusion 
and popularity of even more detective shows in the last decade (such 
as Homicide, N. Y.P.D. Blue, and Law and Order) , it is likely that 
these figures have only gone up. And it is because of these shows and 
the mass media more generally - not the police, the legal system or 
Supreme Court doctrine - that Miranda has become so much a part 
of our national culture. 
Despite this knowledge, however, the overwhelming majority of 
suspects (some 78% to 96%) waive their rights,64 and thus appear to 
consent to interrogation, whether implicitly or explicitly. This fact, 
which is enormously significant in evaluating Miranda's impact, has 
not been disputed by scholars on any side of the Miranda debate. As 
62. Jeffrey Toobin, Viva Miranda, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 1987, at 11 -12. 
63. WALKER, supra note 3, at 51. According to one source, 91 % of all thirteen-year-olds 
can already recite the famous Miranda warnings. Nguyen, supra note 44, at 61. 
64. Richard A. Leo, Miranda and the Problem of False Confessions, in THE MIRANDA 
DEBATE, supra note 5, at 275. 
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Patrick Malone pointed out fifteen years ago, "Miranda warnings have 
little or no effect on a suspect's propensity to talk .... Next to the 
warning label on cigarette packs, Miranda is the most widely ignored 
piece of official advice in our society."65 The same appears to be true 
today. This simple fact - which likely explains Miranda's survival bet­
ter than the doctrinal underpinnings of the Supreme Court's contorted 
post-Miranda jurisprudence - has, for years, baffled social scientists 
and legal scholars alike. 
There are a number of simple theories (some suspect-centered, 
some police-centered) to account for why so high a percentage of sus­
pects waive their rights and submit to police questioning. Perhaps the 
most obvious explanation is that suspects may not know they can in­
voke their rights and terminate interrogation once it has begun. Some 
suspects - particularly juveniles, individuals of low intelligence, and 
the mentally handicapped or disordered - may not understand the 
content or the significance of the warnings. This misunderstanding 
may be due to a lack of cognitive capacity to understand, appreciate or 
act based on the abstract Miranda warnings. Moreover, even adult 
suspects of normal or above average intelligence may not fully com­
prehend their Miranda rights because the "inherently compelling" 
stresses of police custody and/or impending interrogation cause them 
to fail to listen to, register or process the literal meaning of the 
Miranda warnings. Other suspects may not understand the full extent 
of their rights, such as the right to force the police to stop asking ques­
tions, thereby "implicitly" waiving their Miranda rights (perhaps with­
out even realizing they are doing so).66 Finally, some suspects may un­
derstand the import of the Miranda rights· and may desire to invoke 
them but fail to make a legally cognizable assertion of those rights 
(e.g., by using indirect and equivocal modes of expression).67 
Even if-they have the cognitive capacity to understand the Miranda 
rights and register their significance, some suspects may feel that they 
have no choice but to comply with their interrogators. In other words, 
some suspects simply doubt that the Miranda warnings should be 
taken at face value. As Janet Ainsworth has pointed out: 
[The suspect is situationally powerless inside the interrogation room be­
cause the interrogator controls) the subject matter, tempo, and progress 
of the questioning, and [whether the suspect is permitted) to interrupt re­
sponses to questions, and to judge whether the responses are satisfactory. 
The person questioned, on the other hand, has no right to question the 
65. Malone, supra note 4, at 368. 
66. See infra Section III.C.2-4. 
67. Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in 
Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L. J. 259, 298-315 (1993). 
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interrogator, or even to question the propriety of the questions the inter­
rogator has posed.68 
Some suspects may feel as if they are under the control of their inter­
rogator, who is trained to dominate the police-suspect encounter. 
Others may fear that by failing to cooperate they will anger their in­
terrogators, who may thereby retaliate against them.69 Innocent sus­
pects who lack knowledge about how the system works may perceive 
that they will be arrested, incarcerated and/or prosecuted if they do 
not cooperate with authorities; guilty suspects may perceive imminent 
arrest and prosecution if they do not successfully divert suspicion and 
talk their way out of trouble. Silence implies consciousness of guilt, 
and thus naturally evokes suspicion.70 Whether innocent or guilty, sus­
pects may reasonably perceive that submitting to police questioning is 
the only way to exculpate themselves. 
Indeed, several scholars have argued, somewhat counter­
intuitively, that despite its enunciation of rights and cutoff rules, 
Miranda affirmatively encourages suspects to cooperate with their in­
terrogators. Patrick Malone has suggested that " [s]killfully presented, 
the Miranda warnings themselves sound chords of fairness and sympa­
thy at the outset of the interrogation. The interrogator who advises, 
who cautions, who offers the suspect the gift of a free lawyer, becomes 
all the more persuasive by dint of his apparent candor and reason­
ableness."71 David Simon has argued that Miranda - particularly the 
Miranda form - lulls suspects into compliance by co-opting them and 
making them part of the interrogation process, thereby diffusing the 
impact of the Miranda warning.72 I have argued that the ritualistic 
Miranda warnings create a felt sense of obligation among suspects to 
68. Id. at 287. 
69. Nguyen, supra note 44, at 61 ("'[If you don't talk], they'll just make stuff up', says 
one criminal defendant interviewed for this story, who asked to remain anonymous. 'They'll 
lie on your report, so it's on your behalf to just talk to them. Then they'll say you cooper­
ated.' "). 
70. As one observer as pointed out: 
(T)he inmates I interviewed all believed that silence during an interrogation was interpreted 
as guilt. They also believed that if the evidence was against them anyway, keeping silence 
could get them a stiffer sentence than if they talked as they might be considered uncoopera­
tive, a hardened criminal, or something of that sort by the court. 
MALIN AKERSTROM, BETRAY AL AND BETRAYERS: THE SOCIOLOGY OF TREACHERY 71 
(1991). 
71. Malone, supra note 4, at 371. 
72. SIMON, supra note 53, at 214 ("[T]he forms have proven essential. Moreover, the 
detectives have found that rather than drawing attention to the Miranda warnings, the writ­
ten form diffuses the impact of the warning. Even as it alerts a suspect to the dangers of in­
terrogation, the form co-opts the suspect, making him part of the process. It is the suspect 
who wields the pen, initialing each component of the warning and then signing the form; it is 
the suspect who is being asked to help with the paperwork."). 
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show respect to the police who question them.73 Perhaps most inter­
estingly, George Thomas has argued that Miranda warnings simulta­
neously encourage suspects to answer police questions while discour­
aging admissions.74 All of these arguments suggest that there may be 
multiple and overlapping reasons why so many custodial suspects 
waive their rights and so often submit to police questioning.75 It is im­
portant to appreciate that each of these explanations is not mutually 
exclusive, and thus that many of these factors or pressures to comply 
with questioning may be simultaneously present in any given interro-
�oo. 
. 
Regardless of why suspects submit to interrogation, however, 
Miranda offers very little, if any, meaningful protection, once a suspect 
has waived his rights. While it may prevent some suspects from 
speaking to police, Miranda does not restrict deceptive or suggestive 
police tactics , manipulative interrogation strategies , hostile or over­
bearing questioning styles, lengthy confinement, or any of the inher­
ently stressful conditions of modern accusatorial interrogation that 
may lead the suspect to confess.76 Once the interrogator recites the 
fourfold warnings and obtains a waiver (and very few suspects subse­
quently invoke their Miranda rights after they have been waived), 
Miranda is irrelevant to both the process and the outcome of the sub­
sequent interrogation. Any protection that Miranda might have of­
fered a suspect typically evaporates as soon as an accusatory interro­
gation begins - which is exactly when a suspect is most likely to feel 
the inherently compelling pressures of police-dominated custodial 
questioning. 
73. Richard A. Leo, Police Interrogation and Social Control, 3 Soc. & LEG. ST. 93, 1 16-
17 (1994 ) .  
74. Thomas, supra note 58,  at 831 ("This double effect could result from a complex in­
teraction between cognition and behavior. Understanding that they do not have to talk 
might sometimes make suspects more likely to talk because they feel more at ease or feel 
they are equal to the interrogators. They might also think that their willingness to talk in the 
face of the warnings demonstrates their innocence."). 
75. Another possibility, explored in the subsequent section, is that police actively per­
suade suspects - either through manipulation, trickery, and/or psychological coercion - to 
submit to interrogation, despite the Miranda rights. See infra Section 111.C. 
76. As Welsh White has pointed out in this issue, "(i]n the context of twenty-first cen­
tury interrogation practices, however, the claim that a suspect's awareness of her rights pro­
vides an antidote to the coercive effect of custodial interrogation is either naive or disin­
genuous." Welsh S. White, Miranda's Failure To Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 
99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1215 (2001); see also Leo, supra note 64, at 275-76. 
1016 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:1000 
C. Police 
1 .  Introduction 
In 1966 law enforcement in America reacted to Miranda with an­
ger.77 Along with Justice White78 and many others,79 police initially 
feared that Miranda would handcuff their investigative abilities, not 
only ·causing them to lose numerous essential confessions and convic­
tions, but also returning rapists and killers to the Streets only to prey 
again. Police chiefs predicted chaos, believing that the new Miranda 
requirements were the equivalent of a virtual ban on interrogation.80 
Contrary to these dire predictions, however, police have successfully 
adapted to Miranda in the last four decades. Following an initial ad­
justment period, police have learned how to comply with Miranda, or 
at least how to create the appearance of compliance with Miranda, 
and still successfully elicit a high percentage of incriminating state­
ments, admissions, and confessions from criminal suspects. In this sec­
tion, I will illustrate how police have devised multiple strategies to 
avoid, circumvent, nullify or simply violate Miranda and its invocation 
rules in their pursuit of confession evidence. Because American police 
have learned how to "work Miranda" to their advantage - i.e. ,  to is­
sue Miranda (or avoid having to issue) warnings in strategic ways that 
will result in legally accepted waivers - Miranda operates as a weak 
or minimal restraint on police interrogation, contrary to the intentions 
and beliefs of the Warren Court as well as its many contemporary lib­
eral and progressive supporters. As one commentator has pointed out, 
Miranda has become a "manageable annoyance"81 - the anti-climax 
77. When Miranda was decided, Philadelphia Police Commissioner Edward J. Bell de­
cried the decision stating, "I do not believe the Constitution was designed as a shield for 
criminals." LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 176 (1983). Similarly, 
Boston Police Commissioner Edmund L. McNamara complained, "Criminal trials no longer 
will be a search for truth, but a search for technical error." Id. 
78. In his dissent, Justice White stated that: 
There is . . .  every reason to believe that a good many criminal defendants who otherwise 
would have been convicted on what this Court has previously thought to· be the most satis-· 
factory kind of evidence will now, under this new version of the Fifth Amendment, either 
not be tried at all or will be acquitted if the State's evidence, minus the confession, is put to 
the test of litigation. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 542 (1966). 
79. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule " Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. 
REV. 883, 900 (2000) (quoting position paper critical of Miranda issued by candidate 
Richard M. Nixon during the 1968 presidential campaign). 
80. Malone, supra note 4, at 367, 376-77. Ironically, some in law enforcement now pre­
dict "it would be chaos to go back" to a world without Miranda. Brooke A. Masters & Tom 
Jackman, Justice System Worries About Miranda: Some Prosecutors, Judges Fear VA Ruling 
May Try to Fix Something That Isn't Broken, WASH . POST, Feb. 16, 1999, at Bl.  
81. Jan Hoffman, Some Officers are Skirting Miranda Restraints to Get Confessions, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1998, at Al. See also Peter Carlson, You Have the Right to Remain Si­
lent . . .  ; But in the Post-Miranda Age, the Police Have Found New and Creative Ways to 
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of virtually all custodial police questioning - to American police in 
the twenty-first century that does little, if anything, to protect suspects 
against abusive interrogation tactics. 
2. A voiding Miranda 
a. Recasting Interrogation as a . Non-Custodial Interview. Perhaps 
the most fundamental police strategy to successfully negotiate 
Miranda is to do an end run around Miranda's requirements by taking 
advantage of the definitions, exceptions, and ambiguities in · Miranda 
doctrine. Since Miranda warnings are only required when a suspect is 
legally in custody (i.e., either under arrest or not free to leave),82 police 
often redefine the circumstances of questioning so that the suspect 
technically is not in custody and therefore Miranda warnings are no 
longer required. Police recast what would otherwise be a custodial in­
terrogation as a non-custodial interview by telling the suspect that he 
is not under arrest and that he is free to leave - sometimes even after 
detectives have transported the suspect to the stationhouse with the 
express purpose of questioning him inside the interrogation room and 
eliciting incriminating information. In this way, police circumvent the 
legal necessity of having to issue Miranda warnings or invocation rules 
- and thus avoid the risk that the suspect will terminate the interroga­
tion by exercising his right to silence or counsel. The shift from custo­
dial interrogations to non-custodial interviews following Miranda is, as 
several observers have noted, supported by legal doctrine83 as well as 
empirical evidence.84 
b. Implicit Waivers. Another way in which police use the defini­
tions, ambiguities and exceptions of, law to minimize the risk that a 
suspect will terminate interrogation is by obtaining a so-called "im­
plicit" waiver from suspects. To elicit an "implicit" waiver, an interro­
gator must simply read to the su�pect the fourfold Miranda warnings,85 
Make You Talk, WASH. P9ST, Sept. 13, 1998, at 10 (" 'There's a lot of ways to get around 
Miranda . . . .  Most guys know how to get somebody to waive their rights.' ") (quoting for­
mer head of Washington, D.C. police homicide unit). 
82. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
83. In Berkemer v. McCarty, the Court narrowed the definition of custody, holding that 
a suspect is in custody when his "freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with 
formal arrest.' " 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1 125 
(1983) (per curiam)). Berkemer's holding, of course, opens up the possibility that, so long as 
they do not effect an arrest, the police may conduct lengthy "interviews" with suspects with­
out giving suspects Miranda warnings. See generally Kate Greenwood & Jeffrey A. Brown, 
Investigation and Police Practices: Custodia/ Interrogations, 86 GEO. L.J. 1318 (1998). 
84. See, e.g., Cassell & Hayman, supra note 36, at 874; Jerome H. Skolnick & Richard A. 
Leo, The Ethics of Deceptive Interrogation, 11  CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 5 (1992). 
85. You have the right to remain silent; anything you say can and will be used against 
you in a court of law; you have the right to an attorney; if you cannot afford one, one will be 
provided to you free of charge. 
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but need not ask him whether he understands his rights or wishes to 
act on them (what might be called the twofold invocation rules).86 In­
stead, after reading the warnings, the interrogator simply launches into 
the interrogation. If, after hearing the warnings (but not the invoca­
tion rules), the suspect responds to interrogation without invoking his 
rights (that is, by saying nothing or answering the interrogator's que­
ries), he is said to have implicitly waived his rights, and thereby con­
sented to interrogation according to North Carolina v. Butler.87 For 
suspects who would otherwise not know that they can ask an interro­
gator to re-explain the Miranda rights if they do not understand them 
and do not know that they need to answer any questions, the remark­
able legal fiction of a so-called "implicit waiver" obviously obviates 
the import of the Miranda warnings. 
3. Negotiating Miranda 
a. Introduction. Even when they issue the Miranda warnings and 
ask suspects whether they wish to respond to questions, police are 
enormously successful in moving past the Miranda moment, eliciting 
signed waivers, and controlling when interrogation begins and ends. In 
the last thirty-five years, police have learned to skillfully employ a 
range of sophisticated strategies to induce Miranda waivers and thus 
to deliver the warnings and invocation rules in a manner that will not 
lead the suspect to invoke his rights or terminate questioning. 
b. De-Emphasizing the Significance of the Miranda Warnings. As 
Welsh White and I have written about in greater depth elsewhere, in­
terrogators often seek to elicit waivers by minimizing, downplaying or 
de-emphasizing the potential import or significance of the Miranda 
warnings.88 One way interrogators accomplish this goal is by ingrati­
ating themselves with suspects prior to the reading of the Miranda 
rights, engaging in extensive rapport-building small talk, and person­
alizing the police-suspect interaction in order to establish a norm of 
friendly reciprocation and the expectation that the suspect will com­
ply. Another way interrogators de-emphasize the potential import of 
Miranda is by strategically delivering the warnings quickly, in a per­
functory tone of voice, and/or in a bureaucratic manner - communi­
cating that the warnings are a necessary, but insignificant, technicality. 
A third way in which detectives de-emphasize the significance of the 
Miranda warnings is by explicitly telling the suspect that the warnings 
are unimportant, a mere formality to dispense with prior to question-
86. Do you understand these warnings? Having these rights in mind, do you wish to 
speak to me? 
87. 441 U.S. 369 (1979). 
88. Leo & White, supra note 49, at 433; see also Leo, supra note 10, at 662-63. 
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ing, or a simple matter of routine. The purpose of all three strategies is 
to trivialize the legal significance of Miranda, create the appearance of 
a non-adversarial relationship between the interrogators and the sus­
pect, and communicate that the interrogator expects the suspect to 
passively execute the waiver and respond to subsequent questioning. 
As Welsh White and I have written, the interrogator's "hope is that 
the suspect will not come to see the Miranda warning and waiver re­
quirements as a crucial transition point in the questioning or as an op­
portunity to terminate the interrogation, but as equivalent to other 
standard bureaucratic forms that one signs without reading or giving 
much thought."89 
c. Persuading Suspects to Waive Miranda. Another strategy that in­
terrogators sometimes use is to persuade, manipulate and/or deceive a 
suspect into waiving Miranda, typically by suggesting (implicitly or ex­
plicitly) that he will receive a tangible benefit in exchange for talking 
to police. For example, detectives sometimes tell a suspect that he will 
only be able to tell his side of the story if he waives Miranda, implying 
that the suspect will not be able to clear things up unless he first an­
swers their questions.90 Detectives sometimes tell a suspect that they 
can only inform the suspect of the charges against him, or the likely 
outcome of his case, if he waives Miranda.91 Detectives sometimes ac­
cuse a suspect of committing a crime, confront him with real or alleged 
evidence, and then suggest that the range of possible sentences and 
punishments depends upon how favorably the suspect's actions are 
portrayed.92 As Peter Arenella has noted, the implication is clear: if 
the suspect waives his Miranda rights, the police can help him (such as 
by talking to the prosecutor or testifying on the defendant's behalf); if 
the suspect invokes his right to silence or counsel, the police commu­
nicate the message that they cannot help him.93 Sometimes detectives 
explicitly tell the suspect that the criminal j ustice system will treat him 
more leniently if he first waives his rights; otherwise he runs the risk of 
being treated more punitively.94 As Yale Kamisar has pointed out, all 
of these persuasive strategies amount to interrogation before Miranda 
- clearly a violation of both the letter and the spirit of Miranda.95 
89. Leo & White, supra note 49, at 435. 
90. See Leo, supra note 10, at 663-66; Leo & White, supra note 49, at 435-36. 
91. Leo & White, supra note 49, at 440. 
92. SIMON, supra note 53, at 193-207; Leo & White, supra note 49, at 441. 
93. Arenella, supra note 43, at 382. 
94. SIMON, supra note 53, at 193-207; Leiken, supra note 9, at 22-23; Leo & White, supra 
note 49, at 445. 
95. Yale Kamisar, Reflections, Special: Retrospective on David Simon's Homicide, 2 
JuRIST 1, Feb., 1999. Kamisar writes: 
Unfortunately the very police conduct that Miranda tried to forbid seems to be occurring in 
Baltimore police stations. The police are threatening the suspect. They are telling him that 
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4. Questioning "Outside Miranda": Interrogation After Invocation 
If the interrogator fails to elicit an implicit or explicit waiver, he 
may seek to change the suspect's mind by persuading him to recon­
sider his decision or he may simply continue to question the suspect in 
direct violation of Miranda.96 In the last decade, particularly in 
California, numerous police have been trained to question suspects 
"outside Miranda" - to continue questioning a suspect who has in­
voked one of his Miranda rights by convincing him that his words will 
not be used against him. Police typically persuade a suspect who has 
invoked his right to silence or counsel to continue answering their 
questions by falsely telling him that anything he says is now off the re­
cord, that nothing he says can be used against him since he has in­
voked his constitutional rights, and/or that his answers will only be 
used to help the interrogator understand what happened.97 The pur­
pose of questioning outside Miranda is to capitalize on the Supreme 
Court's ruling in Harris v. New York,98 which established the im­
peachment exception to Miranda. As a result of Harris, police can use 
incriminating evidence and information (such as the names of wit­
nesses, the identities of accomplices or the suspect's modus operandi) 
obtained during a Miranda violative interrogation against a defendant 
at trial and prosecutors can even use Miranda-violative statements to 
impeach the defendant at trial should he take the stand. Police inter­
rogators question "outside Miranda" precisely because the Supreme 
Court created the incentive for them to do so. As several commenta­
tors have observed, the practice of questioning "outside Miranda" has 
been extensive in the last decade, particularly in California.99 
unless he talks to them about homicide, they will write it up as a first degree murder and 
turn him over to a "bloodsucking" assistant state's attorney. They are tricking the suspect: 
They are leading him to believe that it is in his best interest to tell them his side of the story; 
indeed, they are pretending that this is the suspect's only chance to get the homicide charge 
reduced or dismissed. What they are really doing in Baltimore (and who knows how many 
other places) is subjecting individuals to "interrogation" before they waive their rights. 
Id. at 6-7. 
96. Some interrogators issue what are known as "bifurcated warnings" to leave open the 
possibility that they may re-contact suspects who choose to terminate interrogation. 
Detectives who use this technique do not tell a suspect about his right to appointed counsel 
unless the suspect first waives his right to silence. For if the suspect invokes his right to si­
lence, he can still be re-approached for subsequent interrogation. However, if the suspect 
invokes his right to counsel, he cannot be re-approached. Seth Rosenfeld, How Improper 
Interrogation By Police Derailed a Murder Prosecution, S.F. EXAM., June 18, 2000, at A6; see 
also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
97. Leo & White, supra note 49, at 460-463; Weisselberg, supra note 41, at 132-36. 
98. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
99. Weisselberg, supra note 41; Weisselberg, supra note 56; Seth Rosenfeld, supra note 
96; Seth Rosenfeld, Miranda Ignored - Will it be Erased?, S.F. EXAM., June 10, 2000, at Al. 
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5. The Bigger Picture: The Police Advantage in Miranda 
As discussed above in Section II, the lost convictions and system 
chaos feared by law enforcement in the immediate . wake of Miranda 
have not materialized. Instead, American police have successfully 
adapted to the requirements of Miranda in ways that allow them to le­
gally dodge the reading of rights or invocation rules, or allow them to 
use psychological strategies that result in a surprisingly high percent­
age of waivers, or allow both police and prosecutors to use the fruits of 
Miranda-violative statements to incriminate suspects. All of these de­
velopments are, arguably, exactly the opposite of what the Warren 
Court intended when it created the Miranda rules. If the goal of 
Miranda was to reduce the kinds of interrogation techniques and cus­
todial pressures that create stationhouse compulsion and coercion, 
then it appears to have failed miserably:100 The reading of rights and 
the taking of waivers. has become, seemingly, an empty ritual,101 and 
American police continue to use the same psychological methods of 
persuasion, manipulation, and deception that the Warren Court 
roundly criticized in Miranda.102 Not only has Miranda largely failed to 
achieve its stated and implicit goals, but police have transformed 
Miranda into a tool of law enforcement, a public relations coup that 
could not have been foreseen at the time it was decided. By largely 
controlling when and how the Miranda warnings are issued, as well as 
the construction of case facts surrounding Miranda disputes,103 
American police have taken the advantage in Miranda. 
In other words, for the most part, Miranda has helped,104 not hurt, 
law enforcement. As argued above, Miranda has helped law enforce­
ment by de facto displacing the case-by-case voluntariness standard as 
the primary test of a confession's admissibility, in effect shifting courts' 
analysis from the voluntariness of a confession to the voluntariness of 
a Miranda waiver.105 By creating the opportunity for police to read 
100. SIMON, supra note 53. 
101. H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE FLAWED PROSECUTION OF CRIME 
IN AMERICA 124 (1996) ("Most people I have spoken to say the warnings have become 
largely an empty ritual, embarrassing to cops and superfluous to suspects."). 
102. Malone, supra note 4, at 367; Martin Bezsky, Living With Miranda: A Reply to 
Professor Grano, 43 Drake L. Rev. 127, 127 ("Interviews, questioning, and interrogations 
are conducted almost exactly as they had been before Miranda, except for the addition of 
warning cards in formal settings."). 
103. DAVID NEUBAUER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE JN MIDDLE AMERICA 187 (1974) ("Al­
though we are accustomed to thinking of these cases in terms of the formal law, a more basic 
issue is what is happening at the police station. The question over the facts provides the basic 
dynamics of the process. Contrary to popular belief, the police have not been overwhelmed 
by the Court's decisions because they largely control the facts."). 
104. As Peter Arenella has correctly pointed out, "Miranda has actually legitimated 
moderately coercive interrogation practices." Arenella, supra note 43, at 387. 
105. See Leo, supra note 64. 
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suspects their constitutional rights and by allowing police to obtain a 
signed waiver form that signifies consensual and non-coercive interro­
gation, Miranda has helped the police shield themselves from eviden­
tiary challenges, rendering admissible otherwise questionable and/or 
involuntary confessions.106 Miranda not only fails to provide police 
with any guidelines about which police interrogation techniques are 
impermissible, but, because it is seen as a symbol of professionalism, 
Miranda also reduces the pressure on police to reform their practices 
on their own initiative. w7 Perhaps the most telling evidence of 
Miranda's lack of harm to law enforcement effectiveness is the fact 
that, for the most part, law enforcement supports Miranda.108 Numer­
ous members of the law enforcement community have publicly ex­
pressed support for Miranda.109 Police, by and large, do not seem to 
see the Miranda procedures as an impediment to effective criminal in­
vestigation. 1 10 As Schulhofer has pointed out, since the mid-1970s, po­
lice have consistently reported that complying with Miranda has not 
produced adverse effects for law enforcement. 1 1 1  As others have 
pointed out, in the mid-1980s, none of the major police lobbying 
groups, such as the International Association of Police Chiefs, joined 
in Attorney General Edwin Meese's call to overrule Miranda.112 In 
1988, an American Bar Association survey found that an overwhelm­
ing majority of police agreed that compliance with Miranda did not 
present serious problems for law enforcement or hinder their ability to 
garner confessions. 1 13 In 1993, several police organizations (The Police 
Id. 
106. Garcia, supra note 60, a t  478; see also White, supra note 76. 
107. Leo, supra note 64; Bezsky, supra note 102. 
108. Leo, supra note 10, at 671 .  As one police manager reported: 
Miranda has been so institutionalized now that it really isn't an impediment to law enforce­
ment. The officers understand it, they don't try to get around it, they don't try to play with it. 
And what they're basically doing is working with it. . . .  Instead of being an impediment, 
Miranda has probably made us do our job better. It gives a better appearance. It gives us a 
more professional appearance to the prosecutorial staff and t'1e defense bar, and most im­
portantly - and I can't emphasize how importantly - it gives us a professional appearance 
in the eyes of a jury, the trier of facts. And those are the people we are trying to impress. · 
They are the ones who must make a decision between guilt and innocence. 
109. See Weisselberg, supra note 41, at 165 n.285 (collecting citations). 
1 10. See Leo, supra note 10, at 671 ("Yet police officers and detectives no longer view 
the Miranda requirements as handcuffing their investigative abilities, but have come to ac­
cept Miranda as a legitimate and routine part of the criminal process, simply another aspect 
of the rules of the game."). 
1 1 1 .  Schulhofer, supra note 10, at 507. 
1 12. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION (1986), reprinted in 22 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 437 (1989). 
1 1 3. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 28 (1988) ("A very strong 
majority of those surveyed - prosecutors, judges, and police officers - agree that compli­
ance with Miranda does not present serious problems for law enforcement."); id. ("Police 
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Foundation, Police Executive Research Forum, International Union 
of Police Associations, and the National Black Police Association) 
filed amicus curae briefs on behalf of Miranda in Withrow v. 
Williams.114 To be sure, a number of law enforcement organizations 
recently filed Amicus Curae briefs in support of Dickerson v. United 
States, but these briefs appear to be the result of Paul Cassell's impres­
sive lobbying and advocacy efforts, not the natural inclination of law 
enforcement, on its own, to abandon Miranda. If there is, in fact, wide­
spread opposition to Miranda, ·police in the trenches have expressed 
surprisingly little desire to overrule it. 1 15 
D. Prosecutors 
Surprisingly, the empirical study of Miranda's impact has almost 
entirely neglected the ruling's effects on the practices, attitudes, and 
decisionmaking of prosecutors. Prosecutors are, arguably, the most 
powerful and important actor in the criminal j ustice system. Their dis­
cretion - especially with the rise of determinate sentencing schemes 
- is simply unmatched by any other actors in the criminal j ustice sys­
tem. Prosecutors decide whether to drop or file charges, the amount 
and type of charges to file, whether to recommend bail and at what 
amount, whether to engage in plea bargaining, and, if so, which 
charging and sentencing outcomes to recommend to courts. Any fail­
ure to properly issue Miranda warnings, any violation of Miranda's in­
vocation rules, as well as any police misconduct or illegality during in­
terrogation can be undone by the prosecutor with a stroke of a pen. 
Future Miranda impact studies need to examine the influence of 
Miranda on the gate-keeping function and decisionmaking of prosecu­
tors if we are to have a complete understanding of its real world ef­
fects. 1 16 
In the last thirty-five years, there has been only one academic 
study of prosecutorial attitudes toward Miranda. In 1981,  John Gruhl 
and Cassia Spohn published a study analyzing 195 questionnaires from 
local prosecutors in forty-three states. They found that local prosecu-
witnesses consistently testified that they comply with Miranda and still obtain statements 
from many suspects."). 
1 14. 507 U.S. 680 (1993). These four organizations asked the Supreme Court to keep 
Miranda claims within the reach of federal habeas corpus in part because, "[t)he law en­
forcement community has seen the enforcement of Miranda and its progeny lead to an in­
creased professionalism within police and sheriff's departments throughout the country. 
Miranda's bright-line rules have proven relatively easy to follow." Brief Amici Curiae of the 
Police Foundation et al. in Support of Respondent at 7, Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 
(1983) (No. 91-1030). 
115. Arenella, supra note 43, at 380. 
1 16. Gruhl & Spohn, supra note 29, at 33. 
1024 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:1000 
tors overwhelmingly supported Miranda.117 Over 81 % of the prosecu­
tors surveyed agreed that police should be required to read suspects 
their rights. However, 69% believed that the Courts should continue 
to reduce the strictness with which Miranda was applied, though most 
felt that the Burger Court's post-Miranda rulings - including Harris 
v. New York's holding that police could use illegally obtained state­
ments to impeach a suspect's credibility at trial - had a limited effect 
on their decisions to prosecute. 1 18  Instead, Gruhl and Spohn found that 
the primary influence on prosecuting attorneys' practices was the de­
gree to which local judges required strict adherence to the Miranda 
guidelines. 1 19 
Gruhl and Spohn's finding of overwhelming prosecutorial support 
for Miranda is consistent with other sources of data. In the 1988 
American Bar Association survey of criminal justice practitioners, for 
example, prosecutors reported that Miranda was not a significant fac­
tor that impedes their ability to prosecute criminals successfully.120 On 
the contrary, as George Thomas and others have pointed out, Miranda 
facilitates the prosecutor's task of getting statements admitted, gaining 
leverage during plea-bargaining and ultimately winning convictions.121 
Prosecutors like Miranda because it makes law enforcement appear 
more professional,122 causes juries to attach greater weight to confes­
sion evidence, 123 and allows prosecutors to argue that an otherwise in­
voluntary confession was constitutionally obtained.1 24 Just as impor­
tantly, Miranda rarely imposes significant costs on prosecutors; it is 
rare that an admission or confession will be suppressed from evidence 
in trial proceedings because of a Miranda violation.125 In short, there 
1 17. Id. at 35. 
1 1 8. Id. at 40-41.  
1 19. Id. at 43. 
120. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 113, at 9. This is consistent with 
Younger's finding more than twenty years earlier - that the Miranda requirements did not 
decrease the percentage of felony complaints issued by prosecutors or the success in prose­
cuting cases at the preliminary stage or at trial. Younger, supra note 9, at 262. 
121. Thomas, supra note 5, at 18-22� 
122. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 113, at 8, 20. 
123. Id. at 29. 
124. Garcia, supra note 60. 
125. In a study of criminal courts in nine medium-sized counties (ranging from 100,000 
to 1 million) in I llinois, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, Nardulli found that only five of 7,035 
cases (.07%) resulted in lost convictions as a result of judges suppressing confessions. Peter 
F. Nardulli, The Societal Costs of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 585, 601 (1983). In a subsequent study of 2,759 cases in the city of Chicago, 
Nardulli reported that judges suppressed confessions in .04% of all cases. Peter F. Nardulli, 
The Societal Costs of the Exclusionary Rule Revisited, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 223, 232. Guy 
and Huckabee found that only 12 of 2,354 cases (.51 %) appealed to either the Indiana 
Supreme Court or the Indiana Court of Appeals from 1980 to 1986 resulted in exclusion of 
evidence as a result of Miranda violations. Karen L. Guy & Robert G. Huckabee, Going 
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are a number of reasons why Miranda benefits prosecutors without 
undermining effective law enforcement. 
E. Trial Courts 
Miranda has also eased the lot of trial j udges - to the likely det­
riment of criminal defendants. By creating a seemingly objective, 
regular, and consistent rule, Miranda has made it far simpler for trial 
courts to decide whether a confession should be admitted into evi­
dence. As Malone has pointed out, "staccato Miranda conversations, 
with their uniform statements and check the box answers, are easier 
for courts to evaluate than sprawling hours-long interrogations."126 
The cost of this simplification, however, appears to be borne by the 
accused. Virtually all observers seem to agree that Miranda has shifted 
the legal inquiry from whether the confession was voluntarily given to 
whether the Miranda rights were voluntarily waived. The Supreme 
Court has said as much in Dickerson, observing that when the police 
have "adhered to the dictates of Miranda,'' a defendant will rarely be 
able to make even "a colorable argument that his self-incriminating 
statement was compelled."127 As White points out, "A finding that the 
police have properly informed the suspect of his Miranda rights thus 
often has the effect of minimizing the scrutiny afforded interrogation 
practices following the Miranda waiver."128 Others have gone further, 
suggesting that as long as Miranda warnings were given, courts ig­
nored interrogation misconduct, freeing the police to coerce suspects 
as long as they had first Mirandized them.129 There is data to support 
this view. A survey of recent decisions by Welsh White suggests that 
once police have complied with Miranda and received a waiver, it is, 
indeed, difficult to establish that the defendant's confession was co­
erced or involuntaryP0 Thus, while Miranda has done very little to 
change the psychological methods and process of interrogation, it has 
changed, de facto, the standard by which confessions are admissible 
Free on a Technicality: Another Look at the Effect of the Miranda Decision on the Criminal 
Justice Process, 4 CRIM. JUST. RES. BULL. 1 (1988). Even Paul Cassell concedes that success­
ful pre-trial Miranda suppression motions are rare, and that courts rarely reverse a convic­
tion on appeal because of a motion to suppress under Miranda. Cassell, supra note 9, at 392-
93. As Alex Nguyen points out, having a conviction reversed because of a Miranda violation 
is so rare that many long time police and prosecutors have never seen it happen. Nguyen, 
supra note 44, at 60. 
126. Malone, supra note 4, at 377. 
127. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000). 
128. White, supra note 76, at 1220. 
129. Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 742-47 (1992); 
see also Leo, supra note 64, at 276-77; Malone, supra note 4, at 377-79; Garcia, supra note 60, 
at 465, 475-76. 
130. White, supra note 76, at 1219. 
1026 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:1000 
into evidence, creating a bright line but diminishing the salience and 
effectiveness of the voluntariness test by lulling judges into admitting 
confessions with little inquiry into voluntariness.131 For if a dispute 
over the facts arises - the so-called "swearing contest" - judges vir­
tually always believe the police officer's testimony, especially if the 
suspect had signed a written waiver.132 
III. CONCLUSION: MIRANDA, VIDEOTAPING, AND THE FUTURE OF 
EMPIRICAL SCHOLARSHIP 
Miranda is one of the most well-known and controversial Supreme 
Court decisions in American history, simultaneously celebrated and 
reviled. There is no question that Miranda has been enormously influ­
ential in the last four decades, redefining the character of police inter­
rogation as we now know it. Elsewhere, I have argued that Miranda 
has exercised a long term impact on police behavior, court cases, and 
popular consciousness in at least four ways.133 First, Miranda increased 
the professionalism of police detectives, removing the last entrenched 
vestiges of the third degree. 134 Second, Miranda has transformed the 
culture of police detecting in America by fundamentally reframing 
how police talk and think about the process of custodial interrogation. 
Third, Miranda has increased public awareness of constitutional rights. 
And fourth, Miranda has inspired police to develop more specialized, 
more sophisticated, and seemingly more effective interrogation tech­
niques with which to elicit inculpatory statements from custodial sus­
pects. 
Despite its influence on policing in the 1960s and 1970s, however, 
Miranda's impact in the twenty-first century appears rather limited.135 
In the last four decades, police, prosecutors, and courts have all 
adapted to and diluted Miranda, using it to advance their own bureau­
cratic objectives rather than to meaningfully enforce the privilege 
131. Thomas, supra note 121, at 31 ("Lower courts routinely admitted confessions using 
the voluntariness test in the Pre-Miranda days, but today's judges have grown up (as judges 
at least) with the Miranda rule firmly in place . . .  powerful institutional pressures encourage 
judges to admit confessions. Unless the judge believes the confession to be false, suppressing 
the confession will deprive the state of its strongest evidence and might result in a guilty de­
fendant going free. Current judges might experience these institutional pressures and react 
in the same way as judges from the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s."). 
132. Leo, supra note 10, at 687; Neubauer, supra note 9, at 163-88; Anthony G. 
Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 785 (1970). 
133. Leo, supra note 10, at 668-75. 
134. This point was also raised in Gerald Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 V AND. L. 
REV. 1417, 1444 (1985). See also SIMON, supra note 53, at 199. 
135. See supra Section Il.B. 
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against self-incrimination or the right to counsel.136 Once feared to be 
the equivalent of sand in the machinery of criminal j ustice, Miranda 
has now become a standard part of the machine. Police have learned 
how t� sidestep the necessity of Miranda or to use clever strategies to 
elicit a high percentage of Miranda waivers. Prosecutors have learned 
to use Miranda to facilitate the admission of confession evidence, to 
add leverage to plea bargaining negotiations, and to buttress cases at 
trial. And trial judges have learned to use Miranda to simplify the de­
cision to admit interrogation-induced statements and to sanitize con­
fessions that might otherwise be deemed involuntary if analyzed solely 
under the more rigorous Fourteenth Amendment due process volun­
tariness standard. 
Miranda imposes few, if any, serious costs on the individual actors 
of the criminal j ustice system or the system as a whole; by virtually all 
accounts, it is a low-cost proposition. It does not impede effective law 
enforcement. Contrary to the arguments of Paul Cassell, there is no 
compelling evidence that Miranda causes a significant number of lost 
convictions - certainly not the tens and hundreds of thousands of 
convictions lost annually that Cassell imputes to Miranda.137 Indeed, 
the best evidence suggests that this difficult-to-ascertain figure is likely 
to be very low. 
If Miranda in 2001 imposes low costs on those whom it was in­
tended to regulate, it also offers few benefits for its intended recipi­
ents. Contrary to the visions of its creators, Miranda does not mean­
ingfully dispel compulsion inside the interrogation room. Miranda has 
not changed the psychological interrogation process that it excoriated, 
but has only motivated police to develop more subtle and sophisti­
cated - and arguably more compelling - interrogation strategies. 
How police "work" Miranda in practice makes a mockery of the no­
tion that a suspect is effectively apprised of his rights and has a con­
tinuous opportunity to exercise them. Miranda offers no protection 
against traditionally coercive interrogation techniques, but may have, 
instead, weakened existing legal safeguards in this area. And Miranda 
offers suspects little, .if any, protection against the elicitation a°'d ad­
mission into evidence of false confessions. As a safeguard, Miranda 
produces very few benefits. 
136. Miranda is an inherently weak safeguard; as Yale Kamisar has pointed out, "[a] 
system that allows the police themselves (rather than a magistrate or other judicial officer) 
to obtain waivers of a person's constitutional rights - and to do so without requiring the 
presence of a disinterested observer or a tape recording of the proceedings - is an inher­
ently weak procedural safeguard." Yale Kamisar, Miranda Does Not Look So Awesome 
Now, LEGAL TIMES, June 10, 1996, at A22. 
137. See supra Section 11.B. 
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As many scholars seem to agree,138 electronic audio- or video­
recording· of interrogations is the most promising interrogation reform 
of our era.139 Like Miranda, video-taping imposes few costs, but unlike 
Miranda video-taping promises high benefits. The fundamental value 
of electronic recording is that it creates an objective, comprehensive, 
and reviewable record of the interrogation for all parties. By preserv­
ing the evidentiary record, electronic recording eliminates the swear­
ing contest, improves police practice, reduces court costs by prevent­
ing unnecessary litigation about what did or did not occur during 
interrogation, and provides criminal justice officials and triers of fact 
with the necessary data to make informed decisions about truth and 
justice. By preserving the evidentiary record for all to see, electronic 
recording deters false allegations of impropriety just as it deters police 
misconduct inside the interrogation room. To be sure, electronic re­
cording is a means, not an end: it leaves unanswered the enduring le­
gal and moral questions that animate· criminal procedure, such as 
when interrogation pressure becomes excessive, what constitutes an 
involuntary statement, and how much we ought to value confession 
evidence. Still, electronic recording coupled with a return to a mean­
ingful voluntariness standard - what Bill Stuntz calls "voluntariness 
with better evidence"140 - may be a far superior basis for dispelling 
coercion, regulating overbearing police methods, and preventing false 
confessions than the overrated Miranda regime. 
Apart from its value as a policy reform, the electronic recording of 
interrogation provides scholars with a virtually unrivaled (and hereto­
fore virtually unplumbed) source of empirical data. Scholars who wish 
to better understand the contemporary, real world impact of Miranda, 
as well as what happens inside police interrogation rooms after 
Miranda is waived and why, might consider studying the case files and 
videotapes of interrogations in Alaska and Minnesota, where elec-
138. E.g., Leo, supra note 10, at 681-92; Cassell, supra note 9, at 486-92; Wayne T. 
Westling & Vicki Waye, Videotaping Police Interrogations: Lessons From Australia, 25 AM. 
J. CRIM. L. 493 (1998). 
139. In both Alaska and Minnesota, police are required by law to electronically record 
interrogations. Stephan v. State, 71 1 P.2d 1 156, 1158 (Alaska 1985) (holding that "an unex­
cused failure to electronically record a custodial interrogation conducted in a place of deten­
tion violates a suspect's right to due process, under the Alaska Constitution, and that any 
statement thus obtained is generally inadmissible"); State v. Scales, 518 N.W. 2d 587, 592 
(Minn. 1994) (holding that "all custodial interrogation including any information about 
rights, and all questioning shall be electronically recorded where feasible and must be re­
corded when questioning occurs at a place of detention. If the law enforcement officers fail 
to comply with this recording requirement, any statements the suspect makes in response to 
the interrogation may be suppressed at trial. . . .  [S]uppression will be required of any state­
ments obtained in violation of the recording requirement if the violation is deemed 'substan­
tial. ' "). 
140. William J. Stuntz, Miranda 's Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 996 (2001). 
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tronic recording of all interrogations is mandated by law.141 Assuming 
police cooperation, the preservation of records, and sufficient re­
sources, scholars could randomly select cases and study, both qualita­
tively and quantitatively, the impact of Miranda on police work, case 
processing, and conviction rates.142 Although it is impossible to ascer­
tain the number of lost confessions as a result of Miranda, with an 
adequate sample size scholars could - using multiple regression 
analysis to control potentially confounding variables and statistical 
significance to infer likely causation - measure whether Miranda de­
presses, increases or has no effect on current conviction rates. Scholars 
could, in addition, do matched jurisdiction studies - comparing police 
files and videotapes in a jurisdiction that has videotaping with the po­
lice files of a demographically similar jurisdiction that does not - to 
analyze the impact of videotaping on police work, case processing, and 
conviction rates. Such a study might begin to resolve some of the em­
pirical and legal debates that have animated the first and second gen­
eration of Miranda impact scholarship. It might also help us better un- · 
derstand whether Miranda, and all that Miranda requires and entails, 
is all that relevant to regulating police interrogation in the twenty-first 
century. 
141. See supra note 139. Some police departments voluntarily record interrogations. 
William A. Geller, Police Videotaping of Suspect Interrogations and Confessions (1992) (A 
Report to the National Institute of Justice, unpublished manuscript). 
142. George Thomas has made similar suggestions. Thomas, supra note 58, at 833-37. 
